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COMMERCIAL AND CORPORATE LAW
The increasing number of corporations having debt problems is
clearly evident in the cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals during this survey period. Among the commercial and corporate
law cases before the court, three were in the area of secured transactions
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). In re Tri-State
Equipment, Inc. I and United States v. Collingwood Grain, Inc. ,2 addressed the
effect of unclear or incomplete descriptions of collateral in the financing
statement. In Maxl Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc. ,3 the court applied the provi-
sions of Article 9 concerning perfection in proceeds in the event of in-
solvency proceedings.
In the area of banking, the case of In re Continental Resources Corp.
4
highlighted the impact on a participating bank's security interest under a
loan participation agreement when the third-party debtor goes bank-
rupt. In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo,5 the court decided the
validity of a fraud counterclaim in a suit to recover on a promissory note,
where a loan officer misrepresented the loan value of an interest in real
property.
Outside of the debtor-creditor field entirely is McKinney v. Gannett
Co. ,6 in which the court resolved the issue of a parent company's liability
for breaching a subsidiary-employee contract.
I. SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 9
In recent years, Article 9 has been a heavily litigated portion of the
UCC. For the Tenth Circuit this past year was no exception. The Tenth
Circuit cases reflect that creditors continue to be plagued by their own
errors. Carelessly prepared financing statements are a particular
problem.
A. Description of Collateral in the Financing Statement
1. Background
Filing a financing statement is the most common method of perfect-
ing a security interest in personal property. While perfection is not a
status that is relevant with respect to the creditor's rights as against the
debtor, a secured creditor generally must be perfected to have priority
against third-party claimants. 7 Perfection results only when the creditor
1. 792 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1986).
2. 792 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. 796 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. 799 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1986).
5. 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987).
6. 817 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1987).
7. T. CRANDALL, R. HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, JR., DEBTOR - CREDITOR LAW MANUAL
7.06(1] (1985).
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can show: (1) the security interest is attached, and (2) a permissible "ap-
plicable step" has been taken. 8 The applicable step usually takes the
form of filing a financing statement.9
Whether a description of collateral in a financing statement is suffi-
cient for purposes of perfection is determined primarily by applying
UCC section 9-402(1)l and section 9-110.11 In interpreting these sec-
tions, most courts have focused on Official Comment 2 to section 9-402.
This comment makes clear that the filing system of the UCC is a notice
filing system, where the financing statement indicates merely that the
secured party may have a security interest in the collateral described.
The presumption is that prospective creditors will have to make further
inquiry to discover the complete state of affairs regarding the debtor's
property. As a result, courts generally approve the creditor's use of the
appropriate generic term used by the UCC drafters to classify collateral,
although creditors run into trouble when the description is too gen-
eral.' 2 Other problems may arise when a description is incorrect 13 or
ambiguous.
2. Description Need Only Provide Enough Notice of a Security
Interest to Lead Later Creditors to Make Further
Inquiry: In re Tr-State Equipment, Inc.
a. Case in Context
Tri-State Equipment 14 deals with the problem of an ambiguous de-
8. Id. Concerning attachment, U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1978) provides: "[A] security in-
terest is not enforceable.., and does not attach unless: (a) the collateral is in the posses-
sion of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a security
agreement ... (b) value has been given; and (c) the debtor has rights in the collateral." (em-
phasis added). Without an enforceable, attached security interest, a creditor has no Article
9 rights.
9. Depending on the type of collateral involved, possession of the collateral or "au-
tomatic perfection" may constitute the applicable step. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1978).
10. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1978) provides in part:
A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor and the
secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the secured party from
which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mail-
ing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the
items, of collateral.
(emphasis added).
I1. U.C.C. § 9-110 (1978) provides: "any description of personal property or real es-
tate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described."
(emphasis added).
12. See B. CLARK, THE LAw OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 2.9[5][c] (1980). Compare In re Fuqua, 461 F.2d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 1972)
("all personal property" too broad) with Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 252, 263 (D.N.J. 1976) ("any and all property,
wherever located" was sufficient); see also In re Mitchell Bros. Constr., 52 Bankr. 92, 93
(W.D. Wis. 1985) ("all business assets" not too broad). There are nine generic types of
collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-105 (1978) (chattel paper, documents, and instruments); id. § 9-
106 (accounts, and general intangibles); id. § 9-109 (consumer goods, equipment, farm
products, and inventory).
13. An erroneous description in the financing statement will prevent the security in-
terest from being perfected unless the error is "not seriously misleading." U.C.C. § 9-
402(8) (1978).
14. 792 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Colorado law).
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scription of collateral. The Tenth Circuit held that a description of in-
ventory was sufficient even though there were three possible different
interpretations of what was covered. 15 The court concluded that leni-
ency was appropriate in light of Article 9's notice filing system. The
important principle established by the case is that ambiguities in a fi-
nancing statement are to be construed in favor of the secured party.'
6
b. Statement of the Case
Two secured creditors each claimed priority in a bankrupt farm
equipment dealer's inventory of used farm implements. The creditor
who filed first described the collateral as: "The debtor's inventory of
new and used Farm Equipment . . . and proceeds therefrom manufac-
tured by or offered for sale by Allis-Chalmers Corporation now owned
or hereafter acquired .... ,,17
In the bankruptcy court, this description was found to be sufficient
to perfect a security interest only in trade-ins the creditor had manufac-
tured. The bankruptcy judge held that the financing statement did not
sufficiently describe used equipment not manufactured or sold by the
creditor so as to provide inquiry notice to third parties of a possible
security interest in the equipment.' 8 The district court affirmed the
decision. 19
c. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower courts by holding
that the earlier financing statement gave legally sufficient notice of a se-
curity interest in all trade-ins, not just those manufactured by the
creditor.
2 0
The court framed the issue to be whether the description was suffi-
cient to put hypothetical later creditors on notice of a possible security
interest in all used farm implements traded in to the debtor.2 ' In resolv-
ing this type of issue, most courts are faithful to the broad notice filing
concept.2 2 Some courts have relied on UCC section 9-402(8) which
provides that a financing statement "substantially complying with the
requirements of [§ 9-402] is effective even though it contains minor er-
rors which are not seriously misleading."
'23
The dominant trend in this area is represented by the Eighth Cir-
15. Id. at 970-72.
16. Professor Clark takes this position. B. CuARK, supra note 12, 2.9[5][b] n.167.6
(cum. supp. no. 1, 1987).





22. This basically means that the function of the financing statement is to merely indi-
cate that the secured party may have a security interest in the collateral described. See
Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 9-402 (1978).
23. See B. CLARK, supra note 12, at 2.10 (citing cases).
19881
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cuit's decision in Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Industries.2 4 In Thorp,
a financing statement covering accounts receivable was held valid even
though it described the collateral as "assignment accounts receivable."
Under the broad notice filing philosophy of Article 9, the use of the
extraneous word "assignment" did not prevent perfection in accounts
acquired in the future. The court held that the financing statement
served its purpose of alerting subsequent creditors of the need for fur-
ther inquiry into the exact collateral covered. 2
5
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Ti-State Equipment (under Colorado
law) is consistent with Thorp. In Colorado, the rule is that the descrip-
tion "need only put other creditors on notice of a possible security inter-
est in the collateral in question."'2 6 The burden is then placed on
subsequent creditors to protect themselves by making further inquiry
into any prior security agreements flagged by the financing statement; in
fact, they are obligatid to make further inquiry.
2 7
Extensive authority exists for the proposition that a marginally ade-
quate description imposes an obligation upon a prospective creditor to
make further inquiry before accepting property offered by a debtor as
collateral. 2 8 For example, in In re Kline,29 the court held that if the de-
scription is sufficient to permit a course of inquiry concerning the prop-
erty allegedly covered, the later creditor will be charged with notice of
all facts ascertainable by pursuing such an inquiry.
The Tenth Circuit supported its conclusion by stating that the de-
scription was not "seriously misleading.''30 In this regard, Professor
Clark states that the test should be whether the error was serious
enough to throw a third-party searcher off the trail. 3 1 The court appar-
ently adopted this test when it held that the notice was not so misleading
as to "simply stop future creditors from making the further inquiries
they were obligated by the U.C.C. to make." '32
In light of the lenient policy behind the UCC's notice filing system,
the Tri-State Equipment decision is at least defensible. It does, however,
stretch this policy to the limit. The bankruptcy judge's interpretation
appears to be the most plausible of the three possible interpretations. A
24. 654 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1981).
25. Id. at 1249-53. See also United States v. Southeast Miss. Livestock Farmers Ass'n,
619 F.2d 435, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1980).
26. Ti-State Equip., 792 F.2d at 971 (quoting Platte Valley Bank v. B &J Constr., 44
Colo. App. 21, 22, 606 P.2d 455, 456 (1980) (quoting Mountain Credit v. Michiana Lum-
ber & Supply, 31 Colo. App. 112, 116, 498 P.2d 967, 969 (1972)).
27. See generally Annotation, Sufficiency of Description of Collateral, 100 A.L.R.3d 10, 59
(1980).
28. Id. See Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Hodgin, 7
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 612 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
29. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) .628 (E.D. Pa. 1956). See also Leasing Service
Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 252 (D.N.J.
1976); In re Hodgin, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 612 (W.D. Okla. 1970); Cargill, Inc.
v. Perlich, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1159 (Ind. App. 1981).
30. Ti-State Equip., 792 F.2d at 972; see U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1978).
31. B. CLARK, supra note 12, at 2.9[5][6].
32. Tri-State, 792 F.2d at 972.
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later creditor could very well have looked at the financing statement and
concluded, as did the bankruptcy judge, that the words "inventory of
new and used Farm Equipment . . . and proceeds therefrom manufac-
tured by or offered for sale by Allis-Chalmers Corporation" 33 meant
that Allis-Chalmers only claimed a security interest in the trade-ins that
it manufactured or sold. But the financing statement did give other no-
tice. The creditor had checked a box indicating simply that "proceeds of
collateral are also covered."13 4 Additionally, the words "new and used
Farm Equipment" preceded the reference to proceeds.
35
d. Implications of Holding
Tri-State Equipment indicates that the financing statement must be
read as a whole and that ambiguities are construed in favor of the se-
cured party. Thus, the normal contract rule that documents should be
construed against the drafter3 6 is simply inappropriate to the question
of whether a financing statement contains an adequate description.
Since the court took a fairly extreme position in finding for the first-to-
file creditor, it is not likely that a more lenient decision will be forthcom-
ing from the Tenth Circuit.
3 7
B. Description of Crops in the Financing Statement
1. Background
When the collateral involved is a crop, UCC sections 9-203(1)(a)
and 9-402(1) require in the security agreement and financing statement,
respectively, a description of the real estate upon which the crop is
grown or will be grown. Most of the controversy concerning the ade-
quacy of descriptions relating to crops arises over the sufficiency of the
description of the real estate upon which the crops are grown, or will be
grown, rather than the sufficiency of the description of the crops them-
selves. 38 UCC section 9-110 provides that the description of both col-
lateral and real estate is sufficient if it "reasonably identifies" what is
33. Id. at 969.
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added). These cases are almost always lessons in drafting. The
following corrected version of the collateral description would probably have prevented
this case from arising: "The debtor's inventory of new and used Farm Equipment ... now
owned or hereafter acquired .... A creditor does not have to mention the term "pro-
ceeds" in either the financing statement or the security agreement. U.C.C. § 9-203(3)
(1978).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979).
37. For another recent decision that is also very lenient see Mid City Bank v. Omaha
Butcher Supply, 222 Neb. 671, 385 N.W.2d 917, 922 (1986), where the court upheld a
description even though the creditor mixed up Article 9 categories by describing inventory
as "all equipment, supplies, and parts."
38. The question of the adequacy of a crop description was touched upon in United
States v. Big Z Warehouse, 311 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Ga. 1970) (reference to "crops" grow-
ing or to be grown adequate to describe a tobacco crop where all crops grown on the land
were collateral for the debt).
1988]
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described. Full blown legal descriptions are not necessary. 3 9 However,
omitting a real estate description altogether is not a de minimus error
under section 9-402.
Courts have become lenient in applying the "reasonable identifica-
tion" test. Most courts have held that a description is clearly sufficient if
it contains the name of the owner or lessor of the real estate, acreage,
county, township, and range of the real estate where the crops are grow-
ing.40 More general descriptions often suffice.
Consistent with section 9-1 10's reasonable identification standard,
two courts have provided some vague but at least partially helpful gui-
dance for determining how precise the description must be. In Chanute
Production Credit Association v. Weir Grain & Supply, 4 1 the Kansas court
stated that a creditor should not be required to make a general search of
the record or a general inquiry in the county as to the land involved.
4 2
In United States v. Oakley,4 3 the court held that the description need not
be of such specificity to enable a stranger to locate the property; a de-
scription is sufficient if it enables third persons, aided by inquiries which
the financing statement itself suggests, to identify the property.
44
2. Description Must Provide Clues Sufficient that Third Persons
by Reasonable Care and Diligence Might Ascertain the
Property Covered: United States v. Collingwood Grain,
Inc.
a. Case in Context
In Collingwood Grain,45 the Tenth Circuit held that a real estate de-
scription in a financing statement was sufficient to perfect a security in-
terest in the debtors' crops, even though the description did not give the
name of the land owner nor include a legal description. The description
still provided clues that were sufficient to enable third persons to rea-
sonably identify the property covered. The court departed from prior
law4 6 only in holding that the description need not contain the name of
the land owner.
39. See, e.g., Chanute Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Weir Grain & Supply, 210 Kan. 181, 499
P.2d 517 (1972); Big Z Warehouse, 311 F. Supp. at 283.
40. United States v. Oakley, 483 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Ark. 1980); In re Colbert, 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 511 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1977); Big Z Warehouse, 311 F. Supp.
283; In re McMannis, 39 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
41. 210 Kan. 181, 182, 499 P.2d 517, 518 (1972). The financing statement, which was
held to be insufficient, contained the following description: "Crops: Annual and perennial
crops . . . on land owned or leased by debtor in Cherokee County, Kansas."
42. Id. at 182, 499 P.2d at 518.
43. 483 F. Supp. at 764. The description at issue in Oakley contained the name of the
owner of the realty, approximate number of acres of land involved, county and state where
the realty was located, and the distance and direction of the realty from a named town. The
description was upheld.
44. Id.
45. 792 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Kansas law).
46. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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b. Statement of the Case
The debtors gave two different creditors a security interest in grow-
ing crops on farm land leased by the debtors. The creditor who was first
to file a financing statement described the tract by including the percent-
age interest, number of acres, section, township, range, county, and
state. 4 7 The district court found the financing statement insufficient be-
cause it did not list the record owner of the land and failed to identify
precisely which tract within the specified section was encumbered.
4 8
c. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
In holding that the description was sufficiently precise to give the
requisite notice, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district
court.
4 9
i. Name of land owner not necessary
The court first ruled that a creditor does not have to include in the
financing statement the name of the land owner as part of the real estate
description. 50 Under existing Kansas law, a real estate description in
connection with crops is sufficient if it contains: (1) the name of the land
owner, (2) the approximate number of acres, (3) the county of the loca-
tion of the land, and (4) the approximate distance and direction of the
land from the nearest town or city. 5 1 The court noted that this list
shows only what will guarantee sufficient description.
The requirement of listing the land owner finds no support in the
UCC, as far as a security interest in crops is concerned. The Kansas
version of section 9-402,52 as well as the Official Text, contain no hint of
such a requirement. Under Official Text section 9-402(5), the name of
the land owner only has to be included if the financing statement covers
timber to be cut, minerals, accounts arising from the sale of minerals at
the wellhead or minehead, or fixtures (for a "fixture filing"), and the
debtor does not have an interest of record in the real estate. If the draft-
ers had intended to subject a description of crops to the land owner
requirement, the word "crops" would have been included.
53
47. Collingwood Grain, 792 F.2d at 973.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 974.
51. In re McMannis, 39 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re Roberts, 38 Bankr. 128,
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1984). Kansas law in this area is in accord with the majority rule; see text
accompanying note 40.
52. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402 (1983).
53. The Kansas version is even less supportive of this requirement where the security
interest is in crops. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402(5) is similar to the U.C.C. Official Text
except that the name of the land owner is always required when the financing statement
covers timber, minerals, accounts arising from the sale of minerals, or fixtures. Crops are
noticeably absent from this list. Additionally, in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402(3), part 2
(crops) of the sample form has a space for a real estate description but no space to include
the name of the land owner, while part 3 (fixtures, timber, minerals, accounts generated
from sale of the minerals) has separate spaces for both a legal description of the real estate
and the name of the record owner.
1988] 475
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ii. Full legal description not necessary
The second issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit was whether the
real estate description was sufficient despite the fact that it did not iden-
tify precisely where the land lay within the particular section specified.
In upholding the description, the court noted that a full blown legal de-
scription is not necessary. 54 Agreement among courts on this point is
virtually unamimous, given the UCC's general notice filing concept and
Official Comment 5 to section 9-402 which expressly rejects the notion
that the description must be by metes and bounds.
5 5
It is the general and vague descriptions that frequently give rise to
litigation. The court cited Chanute Production as an example of what is
not sufficient; the creditor there had described the crops as those "pro-
duced on land owned or leased by debtor in Cherokee County, Kan-
sas." 5 6 The court also mentioned the description requirements set forth
in In re McMannis57 and noted that those items will guarantee sufficient
description.
5 8
While the court expressly does not require the name of the land
owner in a real estate description, there is still some uncertainty as to
how far a creditor can stray from the McMannis requirements. The lead-
ing case of United States v. Big Z Warehouse59 seems to represent the limit.
There, the financing statement, covering all crops to be grown on the
farm of "Oscar R. Chancey" of approximately ninety acres .located "1
Mi. North of Offerman, Ga. All in the County of Pierce, State of Geor-
gia," 60 was held sufficient. 6 1 This decision finds support, since under
the UCC's notice filing system, the financing statement indicates merely
that the secured party may have a security interest in the described col-
lateral, and that further inquiry will be necessary to disclose the com-
plete state of affairs. 6 2 The conclusion to be drawn is that a description
54. Collingwood Grain, 792 F.2d at 974.
55. See Annotation, Sufficiency of Description of Crops, 67 A.L.R.3d 308 (1975). Creditors
should be aware, however, that U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1978) requires a real estate description
sufficient for a mortgage (usually a legal description) where the collateral is timber, miner-
als, accounts arising from the sale of minerals, or fixtures (for a "fixture filing"). See also
Official Comment 1 and the important distinction drawn between the function of the de-
scription of land in reference to crops and its function in the other cases mentioned. The
comment states that:
[flor crops it is merely part of the description of the crops concerned, and the
security interest in crops is a Code security interest .... In contrast, in the other
cases mentioned the function of the description of land is to have the financing
statement filed in the county where the land is situated and in the realty records,
as distinguished from the chattel records.
Id.
56. 210 Kan. 181, 182, 499 P.2d 517, 518. See also Piggott State Bank v. Pollard Gin
Co., 243 Ark. 159, 419 S.W.2d 120 (1967).
57. 39 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983). See supra text accompanying note 51.
58. Id. at 100.
59. 311 F. Supp. 283 (1970).
60. Id. at 285.
61. Id. at 286.
62. U.C.C. § 9-402 Official Comment 2 (1978). See also Bank of Danville v. Farmers
Nat. Bank, 602 S.W.2d 160, 162-63 (Ky. 1980) ("farm of Dale Wilson on Lancaster Road,
4 miles from Danville, Boyle County, Kentucky" was sufficient). Compare United States v.
[Vol. 65:4
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is sufficient if it is more precise than a county-wide description.63
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Collingwood Grain is consistent with
Big Z Warehouse. The court found it irrelevant that the description failed
to identify precisely where the 160 acres of land lay within the single
640-acre section. A reasonable investigation would have disclosed
which particular land was involved, without a general search of the rec-
ord or a general inquiry in the county.
Collingwood Grain is representative of the majority view that if the
financing statement provides enough information to enable third per-
sons through the use of reasonable care and diligence to identify the
property covered, sections 9-110 and 9-402(1) are satisfied, at least with
respect to the real estate description. 64
d. Implications of Holding
Because of the UCC's notice filing concept, most courts have be-
come lenient in judging the sufficiency of crop descriptions in the fi-
nancing statement. The Tenth Circuit's decision follows this trend, and
gives no indication of a more restrictive decision in the future. Yet,
creditors should not feel entirely comfortable in relying on any trend
when attempting to perfect a security interest in crops-or any other
collateral for that matter. The safest approach is to comply with the re-
quirements set forth in McMannis.
6 5
C. Maintaining a Perfected Security Interest in Proceeds in the Event of
Insolvency Proceedings
1. Background
UCC section 9-306(1) defines "proceeds" as "whatever is received
upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or
proceeds." A security interest attached to original collateral also be-
comes attached to any identifiable proceeds. 6 6 When the debtor re-
ceives cash proceeds and commingles them with other funds in a general
bank account, the question that arises is whether the creditor's security
interest continues in the commingled proceeds. Courts have generally
allowed creditors to trace cash proceeds through the use of the "lowest
intermediate balance" rule.
6 7
Newcomb, 682 F.2d 758, 762 (8th Cir. 1982) (financing statement that described the land
as being located in "Jasper County, Missouri, approximately 15 miles northwest of Car-
thage, Missouri" was upheld).
63. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402 comment at 472 (1983) (discussing Chanute Pro-
duction).
64. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-110 comment at 409 (1983).
65. See supra text accompanying note 51. A creditor should not get the idea that using
a legal description is the best course to follow. If a legal description is used, no inquiry
beyond the financing statement is required because of the description's specificity. Thus,
the secured creditor bears the burden of ensuring that no seriously misleading clerical
errors appear. See In re Lions Farms, 54 Bankr. 241 (D. Kan. 1985).
66. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978).
67. Under this rule, which is borrowed from the law of trusts, the assumption is that a
deposit of proceeds into a commingled account remains identifiable where the commin-
19881
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As to perfection in proceeds, there are further complications. If no
insolvency proceedings have been instituted section 9-306(3) specifies
when perfection in proceeds occurs. When insolvency proceedings have
been instituted section 9-306(4) becomes applicable. 68 Concerning
"identifiable" proceeds under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section 9-
306(4), the secured party's rights are not affected by the insolvency pro-
ceedings if such proceeds can still be identified or traced as having been
received on the disposition of the collateral. However, the right to trace
"identifiable cash proceeds" under paragraphs (b) and (c) does not sur-
vive a commingling of the proceeds with other money. 6 9 When com-
mingling occurs, paragraph (d) applies. The provisions of that
paragraph are a substitute for the common law tracing rules, like the
lowest intermediate balance rule. 70 Thus, the ability of a creditor to
identify and trace a greater sum received prior to the ten-day period is
irrelevant; the creditor is limited to the amount deposited by the debtor
within ten days before the institution of the insolvency proceedings.
7 1
Subsection (4)(d) has been a continuing source of difficulty for the
courts. One problem is that the UCC does not specify whether the
phrase "any cash proceeds" should include proceeds received from any
source or only identifiable proceeds. In Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance
Corp. ,72 the Seventh Circuit held that the cash proceeds were limited to
funds from the sale of collateral in which the creditor retained a per-
gled account has equaled or exceeded the amount of the deposit at all times since the
intermingling. See Universal CIT Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of Portageville, 358 F.
Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
68. Section 9-306(4) is as follows:
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a
secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected secur-
ity interest only in the following proceeds:
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds and in separate deposit accounts contain-
ing only proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is neither commin-
gled with other money nor deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency
proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like which are not
deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which proceeds have been
commingled with other funds, but the perfected security interest under this para-
graph (d) is
(i) subject to any right to set-off; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds
received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of the insolvency
proceedings less the sum of (I) the payments to the secured party on account of
cash proceeds received by the debtor during such period and (II) the cash pro-
ceeds received by the debtor during such period to which the secured party is
entitled under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this subsection (4).
69. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.9 at 1338 (1965).
70. WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1013 (2d ed. 1980).
71. A few courts have disagreed with this analysis and have permitted tracing. For
example, in In re Intermountain Porta Storage, 59 Bankr. 793, 796 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986),
the court concluded that § 9-306(4)(d) was not applicable because the proceeds were
"identifiable" under the lowest intermediate balance rule. Accord In re Gibson Products of
Arizona, 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977); In re Dexter Buick-
GMC Truck Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243 (D.R.I. Bankr. 1980).
72. 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974).
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fected security interest. 73 But, in In re Gibson Products of Arizona,74 the
Ninth Circuit held that the phrase referred to all cash proceeds, regard-
less of whether they arose from the sale of collateral in which the se-
cured creditor held a security interest. 7 5 Another problem arises from
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. It is at least arguable that a few of the
bankruptcy provisions conflict with section 9-306(4)(d).
7 6
2. Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-306(4)(d) Provides
Exclusive Means for Recovering Commingled Proceeds
in the Event of Insolvency Proceedings: Maxi Sales
Co. v. Critiques, Inc.
a. Case in Context
In Critiques,77 the Tenth Circuit viewed the facts as requiring a
straight application of section 9-306(4)(d). The court held that the cred-
itor could not reclaim any proceeds since it offered no evidence showing
what amounts, if any, were proceeds received by the debtor within ten
days before the institution of insolvency proceedings. As a result of this
lack of evidence, the court did not reach the issue of what the phrase
"any cash proceeds" means. Nor did it discuss the issue of whether the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 created any conflict with section 9-306(4)(d).
The dissent concluded that section 9-306(4)(d) was not applicable.
78
b. Statement of the Case
The creditor and debtor entered into two separate transactions.
One was a consignment agreement, and the other was a loan repre-
sented by a promissory note. For each transaction, a security agreement
was executed, and a corresponding financing statement filed. The
debtor defaulted on both security agreements. 7 9 Later, a district court
appointed a receiver to operate the debtor's business and hold in trust
any net revenue from operations. 80 The receiver liquidated the debtor's
existing inventory, plus inventory purchased by the receiver, at a public
sale. The debtor then filed for bankruptcy under Chapter VII of the
Bankruptcy Code and state court proceedings were stayed. Funds from
the sale were transferred to the trustee in bankruptcy and the creditor
73. Id. at 1292.
74. 543 F.2d at 656, cert. denied, 430 U.S. at 950.
75. Id. White and Summers argue that the approach in Gibson Products is not defensi-
ble and that the phrase "any cash proceeds" limits the creditor to proceeds of his own
collateral. WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1014-17 (2d ed. 1980).
76. But see WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1017 (2d ed. 1980) (find-
ing no conflict between § 9-306(4)(d) and I I U.S.C. §§ 547 and 545 (Supp. III 1985) or
any other section of the Bankruptcy Act).
77. 796 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Kansas law).
78. Id. at 1301.
79. Id. at 1295.
80. The receiver was appointed after the state of Kansas had filed a consumer protec-
tion complaint against the debtor and the state court had issued a writ of attachment
against the debtor's property. Id.
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filed a reclamation claim. The bankruptcy court rejected the claim, s l
and the district court affirmed.
8 2
c. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower courts.8 3
Before reaching the ultimate task of applying section 9-306(4)(d), the
court had to determine whether the creditor had a perfected security
interest in proceeds under the two security agreements. The creditor
only had trouble with the consigned goods security agreement, which
incorporated a consignment agreement covering "certain items of furni-
ture, household goods, etc ..... ,,84 Although the creditor's failure to
specifically include the term "inventory" in the security agreement did
not prevent attachment under section 9-203 in the inventory assigned to
the receiver, the same omission in the financing statement did prevent
perfection.8 5 The court interpreted a Kansas non-uniform amendment
to section 9-402(1),86 an amendment that specifically authorizes the use
of generic descriptions of collateral, to mean that a creditor cannot com-
ply with this section by identifying collateral any less specifically than by
reference to the general categories of personal property used in Article
9.87
The security interest with respect to the promissory note was prop-
erly perfected. However, in applying section 9-306(4)(d), the court held
that since the creditor failed to show what amounts (if any) were pro-
ceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the institution of the
bankruptcy proceeding, it had no claim to the proceeds generated by the
liquidation sale. 8 8 It was this application of section 9-306(4)(d) that
gave rise to a persuasive dissenting opinion by Judge Logan,8 9 who
highlighted two important issues: (1) the meaning of "insolvency pro-
ceedings," and (2) whether section 9-306(4)(d) applies to proceeds com-
mingled after insolvency proceedings have been instituted. The majority
overlooked the importance of both of these issues.
81. In re Critiques, Inc., 29 Bankr. 941 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
82. Critiques, 796 F.2d at 1295.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The financing statement listed "proceeds, accounts receivable and intangibles
arising from a certain consignment agreement. Id.
86. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402(1) (1983).
87. Critiques, 796 F.2d at 1299. The court's ruling on this issue is strict in comparison
with its ruling in In re Tri-State Equip., 792 F.2d 967, 971-72 (10th Cir. 1986); see supra text
and accompanying notes 7-37. Nonetheless, without an appropriate reference to inven-
tory by either "item" or "type" under § 9-402(1), the secured party was limited by the
description in the financing statement and could not rely on the broader description in the
security agreement. This is an application of what Professor Clark calls the "double filter"
rule which limits perfection to the narrower of the two descriptions in the security agree-
ment and financing statement; neither document can expand the scope of the other. B.
CLARK, supra note 12, at 2.9[5][b] (cum. supp. no. 1 1987).
88. Critiques, 796 F.2d at 1301.
89. Id.
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i. The meaning of "insolvency proceedings" in Uniform
Commercial Code Section 9-306(4)
UCC section 1-201(22) defines "insolvency proceedings" as "any
assignment for the benefit of creditors or other proceedings intended to
liquidate or rehabilitate the estate of the person involved." Several
courts have held that there is an insolvency proceeding even where a
Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy is filed and the debtor is seeking
merely to reorganize his estate, rather than liquidate it.90 Yet, the defi-
nition is broad enough to encompass more than bankruptcy situations.9 1
It specifically includes an assignment for the benefit of creditors as well
as liquidation and reorganization proceedings which may be equity re-
ceivership proceedings under state law that continue when not displaced
by federal bankruptcy law.9 2 The definition of insolvency proceedings
is, therefore, broad enough to include a state law receivership.
The majority in Critiques treated the bankruptcy proceedings as the
"insolvency proceedings" referred to in section 9-306(4), rather than
the state law receivership. 93 As discussed in the next section, the result
is a misapplication of section 9-306(4) for the purpose of applying the
ten day limit in paragraph (d).
it. Application of Section 9-306(4)(d)
The majority held that it did not matter whether the insolvency pro-
ceedings were deemed instituted when the receiver was appointed or
when the bankruptcy petition was filed, due to the fact that the creditor
offered no proof as to the amount of proceeds received by the debtor
within ten days preceding either date.94 In so holding, the majority as-
sumed that proceeds arising after insolvency proceedings are also con-
trolled by section 9-306(4).
Subsection (4) states that "[f]n the event of insolvency proceedings
a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a
perfected security interest only in . . . (d) . . . accounts of the debtor in
which proceeds have been commingled with other funds .. " The language
indicates that section 9-306(4)(d) applies only to proceeds commingled
prior to the date of insolvency proceedings. 9 5 Therefore, section 9-
306(4)(d) was simply not applicable to the facts before the court since
the proceeds were generated after the appointment of the receiver.
90. See, e.g., Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman, 113 N.J. Super. 474, 478, 274 A.2d 306,
310 (1971); In re Conklins, Inc., 14 Bankr. 318, (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981).
91. R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS at 217-18 (2d ed. 1979).
92. 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 1-201:359 (3d ed. 1981). See also
2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.9 at 1337 (1965) (insol-
vency proceedings may take place either under a state statute or under the liquidation or
reorganization provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Act).
93. Critiques, 796 F.2d at 1301.
94. Id. at 1300 n. 9.
95. Id. See also In re Gibson, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1193, 1196 (W.D. Okla.
1969) (holding that the secured party could recover from the trustee in bankruptcy the
proceeds received by the debtor within the ten day period prior to bankruptcy, plus the
amount collected by the trustee from accounts receivable subsequent to bankruptcy).
19881
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
What was before the court was basically a straight bankruptcy
question.
96
d. Implications of Holding
As the dissent noted, the problem with the majority's assumption
that section 9-306(4)(d) applies also to proceeds that were commingled
after insolvency proceedings have begun is that there will never be pro-
ceeds received within ten days before the institution of insolvency pro-
ceedings with regard to items sold after insolvency proceedings. As a
result, secured creditors will always lose here, unless they prevent the
receiver from commingling the proceeds with other money. 9 7 Fortu-
nately, other courts are not likely to follow the Tenth Circuit's approach
to section 9-306(4)(d). If the same facts were to arise again, the chances
are slim that another court would refuse to find that a state law receiver-
ship is an insolvency proceeding within the meaning of that section.
II. BANKING
The troubled oil and gas industry was the breeding ground for the
two banking cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during the survey pe-
riod. The issues in both cases were primarily contractual in nature. Not
surprisingly, the financial problems of at least one of the parties in-
volved in each case helped to give rise to these issues.
A. A Participating Bank's Risk Under a Loan Participation Agreement
1. Background
Under a loan participation agreement, an investing participant ad-
vances funds to the originating lender (referred to as the "lead"), either
for the purpose of purchasing an undivided interest in the obligation of
a third party and in any collateral or as an extension of credit to the lead.
Typically, a bank or other financial institution will attempt to participate
in a third-party obligation (the "loan") originated by the lead when it
has surplus cash to invest.9 8
For an investor contemplating the acquisition of a participation,
either by purchase or as security, there are several potential problems,
including: (1) insolvency of the lead, in which case the funds entrusted
to the lead may be subject to the adverse claims of the lead's creditors or
of its trustee in bankruptcy; (2) inability or unwillingness of the lead to
perform its contractual undertakings; and (3) insolvency of the third-
party obligor. With regard to this last problem, the existence of a future
advance clause in the security agreement between the lead and the third-
party obligor can have adverse consequences on the participant's secur-
ity interest in any underlying collateral.
96. See II U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. III 1985).
97. Critiques, 796 F.2d at 1302.
98. See generally Simpson, Loan Participations: Pitfalls for Participants, 31 Bus. LAw. 1977,
1977-85 (1976).
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When there is a future advance clause, the lead will want to ensure
that the loan is secured not only to the extent of the amount owed on
the original advance but also to the extent of the amount owed on the
future advance.9 9 If the security agreement's future advance clause is
effective, the use of the original collateral to secure a future advance may
dilute any interest the participant might have in the collateral for the
loan if the value and amount of collateral remain the same. The partici-
pant's problem in this situation is compounded when the lead drafts the
participation agreement' 0 0 and in it disclaims any representations or
warranties with respect to the collateral. If the debtor becomes insol-
vent, the lead may be able to use the collateral to satisfy not only the
original advance but the future advance in which the participant may not
have an interest, all at the expense of the participant.
Often, the participant's only real chance to avoid such a result is to
argue that the future advance clause does not cover the later advance on
the ground that it was created for a different purpose than the original
advance. In response to this type of argument, several courts hold that
unless the future advance clause is ambiguous it encompasses all future
advances, and parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict the clear lan-
guage of the clause.' 0 ' Other courts look at both the security agree-
ment and parol evidence to ensure that the parties intended the future
advance clause to cover the particular type of subsequent advance.
These courts generally allow parol evidence to show whether the later
advance was of the "same class" as the initial obligation. This is an im-
portant determination because if the two obligations are not of the same
class the original collateral will not secure the later advance.'
0 2
99. Achieving attachment to the extent of the future advance requires a security
agreement that demonstrates the debtor's intent to give a security interest in the collateral
to cover the future advance. See T. CRANDALL, R. HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, JR., DEBTOR-
CREDITOR LAW MANUAL 7.04[2][b][vi] (1985). The collateral may be real as well as per-
sonal property. For example, a mortgage may secure future advances of value. In fact,
many states have enacted statutes validating the use of the mortgage (or trust deed) to
secure future advances. Id. at 8.04. As to personal property, see U.C.C. § 9-204(3)
(1978).
100. This agreement, between the lead and the participant, governs the participation
relationship. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 733 F.2d 1403, 1408
(10th Cir. 1984).
101. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Dallas v. Rozelle, 493 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1974);
Kimbell Foods v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), aftd, 440
U.S. 715 (1979); State Bank of Albany v. United States, 468 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
102. See, e.g., Kitmitto v. First Pa. Bank, 518 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Marine Nat'l
Bank v. Airco, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Pa. 1975); In re Grizaffi, 23 Bankr. 137 (D.
Colo. 1982). See also T. CRANDALL, R. HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, JR., DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW
MANUAL 7.04[2][b][vi] (1985).
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2. Existence of Future Advance Clause Results in Dilution of
Collateral in the Absence of Protective Provisions: In re
Continental Resources Corp.
a. Case in Context
In Continental Resources,10 3 the Tenth Circuit disallowed parol evi-
dence with respect to the subjective intent of the parties in executing a
future advance but did apply the "same class" test. The court stated
that the future advance was of the same class as the initial advance and
therefore was secured by the original collateral. As a result, the partici-
pating bank's interest in the collateral was diluted.
b. Statement of the Case
The debtor entered into a revolving loan agreement with the lead
bank, the loan being secured by mortgages (collectively referred to as
"mortgage") on certain oil and gas properties. The mortgage contained
a future advance clause. 10 4 Following the execution of the note and
mortgage, another bank purchased a participation in the loan from the
lead bank. A few months later, the lead bank and the debtor entered
into an agreement for a second loan. The note for this second loan, in
which the participating bank did not have an interest, listed "oil and gas
mortgages" as collateral.' 0 5 After the debtor went bankrupt, the lead
bank filed an application with the bankruptcy court to have its claim
under the second note classified as secured (by the mortgage). The
bankruptcy court held that the second loan was subject to the future
advance clause and granted the application. 10 6 The district court
affirmed. 1
0 7
c. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision' 0 8
and rejected the participating bank's arguments that: (1) the lead bank
breached its duty of good faith by using the mortgage to secure the sec-
ond loan; (2) parol evidence should have been admissible to show that
the lead bank and the debtor did not intend to secure the second loan;
and (3) the second loan was not of the same class as the original loan.10 9
103. In re Continental Resources Corp., 799 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying
Oklahoma law).
104. This clause contained the following language: "This mortgage is given to secure
the following indebtedness, to wit [original loan] . .. [and] all loans and advances which
Mortgagee may hereafter make to Mortgagor, and all other and additional debts .. "
Another section in the mortgage stated: "it being contemplated by Mortgagor and Mort-
gagee that Mortgagee may from time to time make additional loans and future advances
hereunder .. " Id. at 624-25.
105. Id. at 623.
106. 43 Bankr. 658 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984).
107. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 623.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 624-27.
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i. The duty of good faith
Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing. According to the drafters of the Restatement of Contracts
(Second), the concept of good faith emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the
other party. I 10 Under the UCC, in the case of a merchant, good faith
means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade."' I I A breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing occurs when one party to a contract seeks to pre-
vent its performance by, or to withhold its benefits from, the other party.
Without more, the mere exercise of one's contractual rights cannot con-
stitute a breach.] 
12
The participating bank's argument that the lead bank breached this
implied duty by using existing collateral to secure a future advance was,
not surprisingly, unsuccessful. The participation agreement clearly dis-
claimed any representations and warranties concerning the sufficiency of
the collateral. In addition, as the participating bank was aware, the
mortgage contained a future advance clause. In light of these provi-
sions, the participant could not have justifiably expected that the future
advance clause would remain dormant. The risk that the collateral
might be diluted via the exercise of the clause was apparent.
In a related argument, the participating bank claimed that the lead
breached a fiduciary duty. As the court noted, the specific terms of both
the participation agreement and mortgage qualified whatever fiduciary
relationship may have existed,. ' 3 and therefore precluded a finding of
breach.
ii. Application of the parol evidence rule
The parol evidence rule bars evidence of prior or contemporaneous
oral or written agreements and understandings which vary or contradict
the written contract.' 14 The rule only applies if the written contract is
an integration, that is, a final expression of the agreement. Moreover, if
the written contract is a completely integrated agreement, parol evi-
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). See comments (a) and (d).
Comment (d) lists examples of bad faith: "evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of
diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to
specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's perform-
ance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) Comment (d).
11. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1978).
112. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
(1981).
113. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 625. The assertion of a fiduciary relationship
between the lead and the participant is frequently helpful in the context of the lead's bank-
ruptcy, as opposed to the debtor-obligor's bankruptcy. If a participant can establish a
trustee-beneficiary relationship in this situation, it may be entitled to a return of any funds
advanced to the lead. See Simpson, Loan Participations: Pitfalls for Participants, 31 Bus. LAW.
1977, 1992-2003 (1976) and the cases discussed therein; Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Federal
)eposit Ins. Corp., 733 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1984).
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1979).
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dence is not even admissible to supplement the writing. 1 5 When a fu-
ture advance clause is involved, the rule generally followed is that the
language of the contract, unless ambiguous, represents the intention of
the parties and that testimony concerning the subjective intent of the
parties in adopting the clause is inadmissible."
16
In the present case, the participating bank argued that the parties
did not intend to secure the second loan with the existing mortgage but,
rather, had agreed to an unsecured negative pledge arrangement." 1 7
The court held that parol evidence to establish this intent was
inadmissible.
The court seems to have been extreme in its application of the parol
evidence rule. By definition, the rule should not be applied to evidence
of subsequent agreements or modifications. 118 Therefore, if the parties
actually did enter into a subsequent agreement that differed from the
original, as the participant claimed, then parol evidence should have
been admissible. The participating bank, however, could never really
prove that there was any kind of subsequent modification."l 9 In the
cases cited by the court, the issue was whether evidence prior to or con-
temporaneous with the writing was admissible. 120 In the present case,
the issue was whether there was a subsequent modification.
The court also addressed the issue of whether the participant was
subject to the parol evidence rule even though it was not a party to the
mortgage. 121 In Fulton v. L & N Consultants, Inc. ,122 the court noted that
in Oklahoma the general rule is "that the parol evidence rule only ap-
plies to parties to the agreement and their privies."i 23 As Professor
Williston notes, such a statement of the rule "has led to misapprehen-
sion."124 Except perhaps for the purpose of showing either fraud
against a third person or some invalidating facts which would be avail-
able to the parties themselves, the rule should apply with respect to
third parties. Furthermore, the parol evidence rule extends to a third
115. Id. The exceptions applicable to the parol evidence rule (e.g., when the writing is
ambiguous) are found in § 214. Id.
116. Kimbell Foods v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 496 (5th Cir. 1977).
117. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 625. A negative pledge is merely an agreement to
forebear from taking some manner of action. In re Continental Resources Corp., 43
Bankr. at 662.
118. The court recognized this facet but called it an "exception" to the parol evidence
rule. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 626.
119. The second note was blank when signed by the debtor's chief financial officer and
filled in later by personnel at the lead bank. The court concluded that filling in the blanks
of the note was not actually an alteration of the instrument, and that in such cases the issue
is whether authority existed to fill in the blanks. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 626
(citing In re Schick Oil & Gas, Inc., 35 Bankr. 282, 286 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983)).
120. Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1983); Fulton v. L & N
Consultants, 715 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1982); Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
706 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1985).
121. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 626.
122. 715 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1982).
123. Id. at 1418. See also In re Assessment of Alleged Omitted Property, 177 Okla. 74,
77, 58 P.2d 134, 137 (1936).
124. 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 647 (3d ed. 1961).
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person who makes a claim through the right of a party to a written con-
tract. 12 5 In the instant case, the Oklahoma rule created no "misappre-
hension" because the court did not consider the participant a stranger
to the contract for the purpose of applying the parol evidence rule. The
court reasoned that the participant was closely affiliated with the lead
bank and was a beneficiary of the agreement.1
26
iii. The "same class" test
The "same class" test, also referred to as the "relatedness rule,"
serves to limit the application of a future advance clause to those ad-
vances which are of the same class as the original loan. 12 7 In reference
to Article 9 of the UCC, Grant Gilmore (one of the Article 9 drafters)
states that "no matter how the clause is drafted, the future advances to
be covered must 'be of the same class as the primary obligation ... and
so related to it that the consent of the debtor to its inclusion may be
inferred.' "128
Different loans intended to provide a debtor with working capital
are of the same class.' 29 A loan is classified as working capital if the
debtor uses the money to obtain current assets or to satisfy current lia-
bilities. Current assets are those assets which are reasonably expected
to be converted into cash, sold, or consumed within the normal operat-
ing cycle of the business or one year, whichever is longer. 130 The court
rejected the participating bank's argument that the second loan was not
within the future advance clause, since both the original and second loan
were for working capital. Even though the debtor used the money from
the second loan for acreage acquisition, that loan was still for working
capital. Because the debtor was in the business of oil and gas explora-
tion and development, the properties acquired could be considered cur-
rent assets.
d. Implications of Holding
Continental Resources illustrates the importance to a participating
125. Id. at 1165.
126. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 626.
127. Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dentsply Professional Plan, 617 P.2d 1340,
1346 (Okla. 1980); Kitmitto v. First Pa. Bank, 518 F. Supp. 297, 300 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
128. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35.2 (1965) (quoting
National Bank of E. Ark. v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff'd sub
non., National Bank of E. Ark. v. General Mills, 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960)). But see
Thorp Sales Corp. v. Dolese Bros. Co., 453 F. Supp. 196, 200 (W.D. Okla. 1978) ("it is no
longer necessary, as between the original lender and the original debtor, for future ad-
vances to be of the same class as the primary obligation").
129. Continental Resources, 799 F.2d at 627 (citing Dentsply, 617 P.2d at 1345-46). The
term "working capital" refers to a firm's investment in current assets.
130. AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PuB. ACCOUNTANTS, RESTATEMENT AND REVISION OF
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH AND TERMINOLOGY BULLETINS,
(final ed. 43 1961), ch.3, § A, 4. An operating cycle is the average amount of time it
takes a firm to spend cash for inventory, process and sell the inventory, and collect the
receivables, converting them back into cash; thus, it is the time taken to go from "cash to
cash."
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bank of obtaining at least some representations and warranties from the
lead with respect to underlying collateral. Participating banks who do
not obtain these assurances face the very real risk of having their share
of the collateral seriously diluted if the third-party debtor borrows pur-
suant to a future advance clause and then becomes insolvent. The par-
ticipant in Continental Resources made the mistake of placing itself at the
mercy of the lead, and found that the court was unwilling to come to its
rescue. Other participants who fail to obtain warranties and representa-
tions can expect similar judicial treatment.
B. Fraud Counterclaim in Response to a Suit Seeking Recovery on a
Promissory Note
1. Background
Courts have often stated that fraud cannot be grounded on mis-
statements of opinion because the element ofjustifiable reliance is ab-
sent.131 The "puffing" rule, for example, allows a seller the privilege to
lie at will, so long as he says nothing specific. Not surprisingly, the rule
has not been favored, and whenever it can be found that there was some
kind of assurance as to specific facts the question of actionable misrepre-
sentation has been left to the jury.
132
A statement of value is generally regarded by the courts as a matter
of opinion. 133 However, transforming such a statement of opinion into
one of fact requires very little. Thus, a representation by the seller of
the price paid for the property being sold is considered one of fact.
134
When the seller misrepresents the price paid (cost), courts generally
give relief if the other elements of fraud are met. 1
3 5
2. Misrepresentation of Loan Value of Property Provides Basis
for Fraud Counterclaim: Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v.
Palermo
a. Case in Context
In Palermo, 136 it was not actually the price paid for the property that
131. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, (5th ed. 1984) (citing
cases) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
132. Id. at 757.
133. Byers v. Federal Land Co., 3 F.2d 9, 11-12 (8th Cir. 1924); Reeder v. Guaranteed
Foods, 194 Kan. 386, 394, 399 P.2d 822, 830-31 (1965).
134. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 131, at 758. Representations as to the price at
which similar property is selling, the amount of an offer made by a third person, the state
of the market, or even the lowest price at which a purchase can be made from another, are
also considered to be statements of fact. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 168-169. "An assertion is one of opinion if it expresses only a belief, without certainty,
as to the existence of a fact or expresses only a judgment as to quality, value, authenticity,
or similar matters." Id. § 168(1) at 455.
135. Fraud consists of: (1) a material, false representation; (2) made with knowledge of
falsity, or recklessly, and made as a positive assertion; (3) with intention that it be acted
upon by another; (4) actual reliance; and (5) resulting injury. D & H Co. v. Shultz, 579
P.2d 821, 824 (Okla. 1978); Johnson v. Eagle, 355 P.2d 868, 870 (Okla. 1960).
136. 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987) (incorporating the law of Oklahoma as the federal
rule of decision).
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was misrepresented, but rather the amount owed- on the property. The
court held this to be a misrepresentation of fact, not opinion, and up-
held a jury verdict in the buyer's favor. 137 In reaching its decision, the
court, by analogy, relied on cases holding that a buyer of property may
maintain an action for fraud against a seller who misrepresents the price
he has paid for the property.'
38
b. Statement of the Case
Penn Square Bank was arranging the sale of an interest in oil wells
with problem loans. A loan officer at the bank phoned Palermo (buyer)
and represented, among other things, that the bank could not take less
than $130,000 for the interest because "that's what the man owes the
bank for it.' s 9 Evidence indicated that the loan officer knew that the
bank had actually loaned the owner only fifty thousand dollars (secured
by the oil wells). The buyer of the wells testified that the amount the
bank was willing to loan on the property was important to him in deter-
mining the value of the wells and that he would not have bought the
property had he known the truth.'
40
After production on the wells was lower than expected, the buyer
stopped making payments on the note. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, as receiver of the insolvent bank, sued to recover the bal-
ance due. The buyer defended the suit on the basis of fraud, and also
counterclaimed, seeking both rescission and damages. A jury rendered
a verdict in favor of the buyer.'
4 1
c. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit upheld the jury's verdict for the buyer on his
claim of fraud. 142 He was not allowed, however, to pursue the fraud
claim as one for rescission because he had not acted promptly in exercis-
ing his right of rescission.' 43 The buyer was able to assert the fraud
claim only as a set-off or counterclaim in the nature of recoupment to
reduce or eliminate his liability on the promissory note; the running of a
two-year state statute of limitations precluded any affirmative relief.'
44
On the issue of damages, the court set aside the jury's award and or-
137. Id. at 1336.
138. Id. (citing Withroder v. Elmore, 187 P. 863, 864 (Kan. 1920); Wisconsin Steel
Treating & Blasting v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 379, 383, 127 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1964)).
139. Palermo, 815 F.2d at 1333.
140. Id. at 1336.
141. Id. at 1332.
142. Id. at 1341.
143. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 235 (West 1966).
Rescission, when not effected by consent, can be accomplished only by the use...
of reasonable diligence to comply with the following rules: 1. He must rescind
promptly, upon discovering the facts which entitle him to rescind ... and 2. He
must restore to the other party everything of value which he has received from
him under the contract; or must offer to restore the same ....
Id.; see also Harmon v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 196 Okla. 607, 167 P.2d 360 (1946).
144. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West 1960).
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dered a new trial on this issue alone. 14 5
i. The fact-opinion distinction
The Tenth Circuit's opinion illustrates the difference between mis-
representations of "fact" and "opinion". The traditional rule is that,
while misstatements of fact may be actionable, misstatements of opinion
are usually not actionable when parties bargain at arm's length. 146 This
attempted distinction may not be a meaningful one; as noted by one
scholar, "it is scientifically impossible to distinguish fact from opin-
ion." 14 7 Still, the words probably have meanings which correspond
roughly to concepts sufficiently distinct from each other to justify some
differences in treatment." 48 Nonetheless, it is clear that the scope of
immunity for misstatements of opinion is constantly shrinking. 149
Notwithstanding a few older cases to the contrary, when a statement
goes beyond mere value to include assertions of the amount paid for
property, such assertions may be actionable. 150
The court's holding in Palermo that the bank loan officer's statement
of the amount loaned on the property was one of fact rather than opin-
ion and its application of the fact-opinion rule were clearly correct. To
say that the loan officer's statement was merely an opinion of value
would be to ignore reality. The statement is as much a fact as a state-
ment by a seller that he himself paid a certain amount for the property.
Therefore, the court could properly apply, by analogy, the law from
cases holding that misstatements of the amount paid (cost) are
actionable.
Despite this apparent logic, several early cases hold that a misstate-
ment by the seller of the price paid for the property does not lay the
foundation for a fraud action.iS The rationale used is that this type of
misstatement is no more than an indication of the seller's opinion of the
property's value-or mere "dealer's talk." The driving force behind the
cases seems to have been the doctrine of caveat emptor ("buyer beware"),
which had a significant influence on the courts' analyses. Consistent
with this doctrine, courts were strictly applying the materiality and justi-
fiable reliance elements of fraud.
To reach a different result from these cases, the Tenth Circuit
145. Palermo, 815 F.2d at 1341.
146. See James & Gray, Misrepresentation-Part 11, 37 MD. L. REV. 488, 490 (1978).
147. Keeton, Fraud. Misrepresentations of Opinion, 21 MINN. L. REV. 643, 657 (1937) (cit-
ing 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1919 (rev. 1978)). Keeton believed that the important
distinction is between assertions of knowledge and those of opinion, rather than assertion
of fact and those of opinion. Id. at 657. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 168 comment a (1979), which follows this view.
148. James & Gray, supra note 146, at 489.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Wisconsin Steel Treating & Blasting Co. v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 379, 383,
127 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1964).
151. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Conner, 60 Me. 578, 11 Am. Rep. 212 (1872); Annotation,
Fraud- Misrepresentation of Price, 66 A.L.R. 188, 191-93 (1930). Many of the cases so hold-
ing state that there must be a fiduciary relation between the seller and buyer before there
can be any kind of recovery. See, e.g., Banta v. Palmer, 47 Ill. 99 (1868).
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found it necessary to distinguish Steiner v. Hughes. 152 As the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted, the Oklahoma court in Steiner based its decision on a lack of
actual reliance. 153 The seller misrepresented the profit per share it
would make by selling stock to the buyer; but the buyer could not have
been misled because he had checked for himself the price of the stock on
the day in question. The Oklahoma court's statement of the law' 54 was
a portion of some misguided dicta which almost certainly would not be
followed today. 1
55
it. Measure of damages
Courts are divided over two standards for measuring damages in
fraud actions. One standard is the "out of pocket" rule, followed by a
minority of courts, whereby the injured party receives the difference be-
tween the value of what he has parted with and the value of the property
he has received. 156 This measure is always adopted as to a defense in
the nature of recoupment. 157 The other measure, called the "loss-of-
bargain" rule, gives the injured party the difference between the value of
the property as represented and its actual value on the date of
purchase. 1
5 8
After holding that the buyer could assert his fraud claim only as a
set-off or counterclaim in the nature of a recoupment, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the appropriate measure of damages was the loss of bar-
gain rule, although the court did not label the rule as such. 15 9 Techni-
cally, the out of pocket rule should have been applied since the buyer
could only seek a set-off or recoupment. Yet, the court in effect did so
152. 172 Okla. 268, 44 P.2d 857 (1935). In Steiner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated that:
[W]e have found no case, by this court, in which the contended fraud consisted
merely of a statement made by the seller, upon inquiry by the purchaser, that the
property was costing, or had cost him, the seller, more than it actually cost, where
this court has held that such a statement, unless coupled with other elements of
fraud, inequality of the parties, overreaching or confidential relations, has been
held to constitute actionable misrepresentation.
Id. at 270, 44 P.2d at 860.
153. Palermo, 815 F.2d at 1337.
154. See supra note 152.
155. See, e.g., Beavers v. Lamplighters Realty, 556 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Okla. Ct. App.
1976) (statement by seller that a third party had offered a certain sum for property is a
"statement of material fact affecting the value and may form the basis for an action of
deceit,") (quoting Chisum v. Huggins, 55 Okla. 423, 441, 154 P. 1146, 1152 (1916)); Varn
v. Maloney, 516 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Okla. 1973);Johnson, 355 P.2d at 871. Even many of the
earlier cases are in accord. See Annotation, Fraud - Misrepresentation of Price, 66 A.L.R. 188
(1930). For a more recent case that is representative of the increasing tendency of courts
to find that assertions of the amount which has been paid or offered for the property are
actionable, see Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 328 Mass. 341, 103 N.E.2d 692
(1952); Annotation, Fraud - Misrepresentation by Lessor, 30 A.L.R.2d 923 (1953). In
Kabatchnick, the defendant-landlord induced a tenant to agree to a substantially higher rent
by falsely stating that a prospective tenant had offered to lease the premises at the higher
rent.
156. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 131, at 767-68.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 768; A.A. Murphy, Inc. v. Banfield, 363 P.2d 942, 946 (Okla. 1961).
159. Palermo, 815 F.2d at 1340-41 (citing A.A. Murphy, Inc., 363 P.2d at 946).
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when it stated that under the circumstances "the value of the property as
represented is equal to the price paid for the property."' 160 Where, as
here, the injured party can recover only by way of set-off or recoupment,
the final result is that the damages for fraud' 6' are subtracted from the
amount due on the promissory note. The net result is a reduction in the
buyer's liability.
d. Implications of Holding
The Tenth Circuit's holding is consistent with the increasing ten-
dency among courts to find that misrepresentations of the price paid for
property are actionable. The case is certainly not surprising, but is a
warning to banks that they cannot misrepresent the loan value of prop-
erty when selling property covered by a security agreement and thereaf-
ter argue that the representation was a mere "opinion."
III. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANY FOR BREACHING SUBSIDIARY-
EMPLOYEE CONTRACT
A. Background
While the board of directors of a corporation is entrusted with the
general power of managing the business and affairs of the corporation,
the directors may delegate many decisions to corporate officers or
agents. 16 2 In most publicly held corporations, the full time, profes-
sional management runs the business-the directors having more of an
oversight role. The directors of large corporations find it necessary to
hire managers with specific expertise and to delegate to those managers
extensive authority. Nonetheless, problems may arise when too much
authority is delegated.
One problem in particular arises in the context of a parent-subsidi-
ary relationship where an employment contract exists between the sub-
sidiary and its highest ranking employee (usually called the chief
executive officer). Perhaps to the dismay of the employee, the parent
company might find it desirable from a managerial standpoint to involve
itself significantly in the subsidiary's day-to-day operations. When the
parent interferes with the employment contract, the employee may de-
cide to sue for breach. Aside from proving breach, the employee may
have to overcome some other obstacles before obtainiig a judgment
against the parent. One obstacle is the parent's argument that the con-
tract is invalid because it gives the employee so much authority that it
strips the subsidiary's board of directors of its essential function. An-
other obstacle is that of holding the parent liable when it is not a party
160. Id. at 1341 n.3.
161. The total damages would include consequential damages if proximately caused by
the fraudulent conduct. Barnes v. McKinney, 589 P.2d 698, 701-02 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
162. "All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors,
subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation." REVISED MODEL BUsi-
NESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.01 (b) (1984) (emphasis added).
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to the contract. In this situation, a court may analyze the issue in terms
of whether the corporate veil of the subsidiary should be "pierced" in
order to reach through to the parent.
B. Parent Company as Non-Signatory Party Held Liable: McKinney v.
Gannett Co.
1. Case in Context
In McKinney, 163 the court held that the parent company could be
liable for breaching the subsidiary-employee contract on the ground
that the contract was inseparable from another contract to which the
parent was a party. Not content to rely on that ground alone, the court
also concluded that it was proper to pierce the subsidiary's corporate
veil using the "alter ego" doctrine so as to hold the parent liable.'
64
The contract itself was held to be a proper delegation of power, even
though the employee was in complete charge of most of the business
and operating aspects of the subsidiary.'
6 5
2. Statement of the Case
Pursuant to an "Agreement and Plan of Reorganization," the plain-
tiff, McKinney, sold his newspaper company to Gannett (parent com-
pany). The agreement included a ten year employment contract
between McKinney and the newspaper company (subsidiary). The em-
ployment contract, which the parent company did not sign, provided
that McKinney would remain in charge of the business, operations,
news, and editorial policies of the subsidiary for the first five years of the
contract period, and in charge of the news and editorial policies for the
second five years.
16 6
After the relationship between McKinney and the parent company
deteriorated, McKinney sued both the parent and the subsidiary. Mc-
Kinney won on his breach of contract claim in the district court, which
ordered the equitable remedy of "tolling" the running of the employ-
ment contract for the period from the date the parent effectively abro-
gated the plaintiff's contract rights until the final disposition of the
lawsuit. 167
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and agreed
that the parent company could be held liable for breach of contract;
168
163. 817 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying New Mexico law).
164. Id. at 666-67.
165. Id. at 667-69.
166. Id. at 662.
167. Id. at 663.
168. The court held that the parent company breached the employment contract on six
different occassions; two of the breaches were material. Id. at 669-7 1. A material, or "to-
tal," breach of contract is a non-performance of duty that is so important as to justify the
injured party in treating the whole transaction as at an end. 4 A. COREIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 946 (1951).
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that the employment contract was a valid delegation of power from the
subsidiary's directors; and that the remedy of tolling was an appropriate
form of relief.
a. Basis for Parent Company Liability
In holding the parent liable despite the fact that it was not a signa-
tory to the employment contract, the court first ruled that the parent was
liable because it was a party to the "Agreement and Plan of Reorganiza-
tion" which was inseparable from the employment contract. This result
seems to follow from an application of ordinary agency rules, which the
court did not recognize. Considering that the parent (as principal) dom-
inated and directed the subsidiary (as agent) in the transaction by draft-
ing the employment contract and negotiating with the employee, the
subsidiary's act of contracting with the employee could be deemed the
act of the parent.' 6 9 Therefore, it was not actually necessary for the
court to also "pierce the corporate-veil" of the subsidiary as a way of
holding the parent liable.17
0
Aside from the question of whether it should have been used at all,
the application of the concept of piercing the corporate veil was proper
under the circumstances. To pierce the corporate veil is to disregard
the separate existence of a corporation and to deny a shareholder the
benefit of limited liability. The test-obviously result oriented-is sim-
ply whether recognition of the separate existence of the corporation
would produce unjust or undesirable consequences inconsistent with
any legitimate corporate purpose.171 Some courts, like the Tenth Cir-
cuit in the present case, have applied the "alter ego" doctrine as the
169. See C. Krendl and J. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing The Inquiry, 55 DEN.
L.J. 1, 3 n.9 (1978).
170. Professor Hamilton states:
[N]o conceptual problems emerge when liability is imposed upon shareholders
under conventional theories of agency or tort law. To argue that the corporate
veil is 'pierced' in such cases is both unnecessary and confusing. If the share-
holder is acting as a principal in his own name, he is clearly liable on the
obligation.
The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 983 (1971).
171. See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS § 146, at 346 (3d ed. 1983);
C. Krendl and J. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing The Inquiry, 55 DEN. L.J. 1, 15
(1978) (three requisites to piercing the corporate veil: instrumentality, improper purpose,
and proximate causation). In In re Clarke's Will, 204 Minn. 574, 578, 284 N.W. 876, 878
(1939) (cited by H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra, at 345), the court said:
Many cases present avowed disregard of corporate entity. But they all came to
just this-courts simply will not let interposition of corporate entity or action pre-
vent a judgment otherwise required. Corporate presence and action no more
than those of an individual will bar a remedy demanded by law in application to
facts. Hence, the process is not accurately termed one of disregarding corporate
entity. It is rather and only a refusal to permit its presence and action to divert
the judicial course of applying law to ascertained facts. The method neither
pierces any veil nor goes behind any obstruction, save for its refusal to let one fact
bar the judgment which the whole sum of facts requires.
For such reasons, we feel that the method of decision known as 'piercing the
corporate veil' or 'disregarding the corporate entity' unnecessarily complicates
decision. It is dialectally ornate and correctly guides understanding, but over a
circuitous and unrealistic trail. The objective is more easily attainable over the
direct and unencumbered route followed herein.
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basis for piercing the corporate veil.' 7 2 To invoke the doctrine, it must
be shown that the corporation was a mere instrumentality for the trans-
action of the shareholder's own affairs; that there is such a unity of inter-
est and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and
the shareholder no longer exist; and to recognize the corporation's sep-
arate existence would promote unjustice or protect fraud.
173
In its application of the alter ego doctrine, the court relied on the
following facts: (1) the parent had complete stock ownership of the sub-
sidiary and controlled its board of directors; 17 4 (2) the parent in effect
treated the subsidiary as a division of the whole; (3) all of the subsidi-
ary's revenue went to the parent; (4) all of the subsidiary's capital ex-
penditures were approved by the parent; (5) the parent drafted the
employment contract and negotiated with the plaintiff; and (6) the par-
ent directly intervened in the personnel matters of the subsidiary. 1
7 5
Moreover, the court concluded that the parent company's dominion
over the subsidiary was used for a wrongful purpose, which was to frus-
trate McKinney's contract rights.
b. Delegation of Managerial Authority
The board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing
the corporation. However, it may delegate the power to transact not
only ordinary and routine business but also business requiring the high-
est degree ofjudgment and discretion. 176 What the board may not do is
delegate its entire duties of management to an individual officer. 177 The
problem is determining when a particular delegation goes too far.
Although one of degree, the test seems to be whether the board of di-
rectors has retained at least its basic authority to govern. If it has not,
the delegation and any contract involved will be invalid. For example, in
Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 178 the board of directors of a corpo-
ration organized to operate a theatre employed a member of the board
to be general manager, and by contract attempted to transfer all control
over bookings, personnel, admission prices, salaries, contracts, expenses
and even fiscal policies to the general manager. The California court
172. E.C.A. Environmetal Management Serv. v. Toenyes, 679 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1984)
(parent liable for breach of contract damages where subsidiary was alter ego of parent);
Harlow v. Fibron Corp., 100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 100
N.M. 439, 671 P.2d 1150 (1983); McCulloch Gas Transmission Co. v. Kansas-Nebraska
Natural Gas Co., 768 F.2d 1199 (10th Cir. 1985).
173. 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41. 10 at 397
(perm. ed. 1983).
174. This fact is never conclusive by itself since such control is no more than a normal
consequence of controlling share ownership. See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 171,
§ 148, at 355; London v. Bruskas, 64 N.M. 73, 324 P.2d 424, 427 (1958).
175. McKinney, 817 F.2d at 667. See Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979,
992-93 (1971).
176. 2 W. FLETCHER, supra note 173, § 495 at 498. Many statutes expressly authorize
delegation subject to certain limitations; see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-48 (1978).
177. Boston Athletic Ass'n v. International Marathons, Inc., 392 Mass. 356, 467 N.E.2d
58 (1984).
178. 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823, 832-33 (1953).
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held that the contract was void and unenforceable. The general man-
ager was under a duty to make periodic reports to the board, but that
was held not to constitute a sufficient retention of control by the
board. 1
7 9
In the instant case, the Tenth Circuit held that the contract was
valid because the subsidiary's board of directors had not totally dele-
gated its authority to run the affairs of the corporation to the plaintiff.
Unlike Kennerson, the employee was still responsible to the board of di-
rectors under the employment contract and the board did set corporate
and departmental budget limitations. 180
c. The Equitable Remedy of Tolling
After rejecting the parent company's argument based on election of
remedies, 18 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's order that the
employment contract be tolled from the date of the first breach until the
date of final judgment. 1
8 2
Tolling is an equitable remedy that is often used to adjust the rights
of the parties under an oil and gas lease. Where a lessor has placed a
cloud on the title of the lease by seeking judicial cancellation of the
lease, a court may suspend (toll) the running of the lease terms. Out of
fairness to the lessee, the obligations of the lessee to the lessor are sus-
pended during the time such a claim is being asserted. 183 The purpose
of tolling is not to punish the lessor but to restore the parties to the
position they occupied originally.1
84
Tolling is not restricted to the oil and gas lease context. As the
Tenth Circuit held, the remedy may be appropriate where the term of a
179. Id. Apparently, this duty to report did not mean much since the board did not
retain the power to act in response to the reports. See also Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana
Mutual Casualty Co., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1930); Long Park v. Trenton-New Brunswick
Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633, 634-35 (1948) (the powers of the directors
over the management of the business were "completely sterilized").
180. McKinney, 817 F.2d at 668. The fact that a valid employment contract exists in
such a case does not limit the board's authority to remove the officer, with or without
cause. But removal without cause in breach of the contract usually subjects the corporation
to liability for damages. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT §§ 8.43-44 (1984);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-49 (1978).
181. If a party has more than one possible remedy, her manifestation of a choice of one
of them (by bringing suit or otherwise) is a bar to another remedy if the remedies are
inconsistent and the other party materially changes her position in reliance on the mani-
festation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 378 (1979). See also Three Rivers Land
Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240, 243 (1982), overruled on other grounds, Univer-
sal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 728 P.2d 467, 469 (1986). The court rejected the
parent's argument on the ground that under Maddoux it was appropriate to consider the
conduct of the party asserting the doctrine of election to determine whether that party
should be allowed to benefit from its application, and that the parent's conduct was objec-
tionable enough to preclude an application of the doctrine. McKinney, 817 F.2d at 673.
182. McKinney, 817 F.2d at 672-74. The court relied on Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. An-
drus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1340-42 (10th Cir. 1982), where it tolled the primary term of leases
on a reservation during the pendency of the tribe's suit to cancel the leases.
183. Continental Oil Co. v. Osage Oil & Refining Co., 69 F.2d 19, 23-24 (10th Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 616 (1932); Morrison Oil and Gas Co. v. Burger, 423 F.2d
1178, 1182-83 (5th Cir. 1970).
184. See 2 E. KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS § 26.14 (1964).
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contract has been interrupted by the conduct of one of the parties. 1
85
4. Implications of Holding
The importance of McKinney is its clear indication that a parent
company should not expect to be able to dominate a subsidiary to the
extent of interfering with the rights of those who have contracted with
the subsidiary and still obtain the benefit of limited liability. 18 6 If the
interference is deemed wrongful, courts are generally willing to find
some way of holding the parent liable even though it is not a party to the
contract. McKinney shows that the Tenth Circuit is no exception.
CONCLUSION
In its disposition of the Article 9 issues during the survey period,
the Tenth Circuit was faithful for the most part to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code's underlying policy of flexibility and leniency. In Ti-State
Equipment and Collingwood Grain, the court gave the first-to-file creditor in
each case the benefit of this policy in holding the description of collat-
eral sufficient to perfect the security interest. In Critiques, the creditor
was not so fortunate. The court there held a financing statement de-
scription of collateral to be insufficient, and erred significantly by apply-
ing the insolvency provisions of section 9-306(4), with regard to the
secured party's perfected security interest under the second of two se-
curity ageements.
Given the present economic environment, it is critically important
for creditors to take the proper steps to protect themselves. The partici-
pating bank in Continental Resources undoubtedly realized this after having
its share of the collateral diluted because of the use of a valid future
advance clause. In Palermo, the bank's attempt to rid itself of a problem
loan backfired when the court allowed the buyer of the collateral (real
property) to recover for fraud because the loan value of the property
was misprepresented.
Finally, in McKinney v. Gannett the court held the parent company,
Gannett, liable for breaching an employment contract between its sub-
sidiary and the subsidiary's chief executive officer.
Jeffrey S. Mulien
185. McKinney, 817 F.2d at 673. The court stressed that the remedy was not specific
performance in disguise. Id. at n.8 ("we are confronted with a declaration of contract
rights and not a coercive order decreeing enforcement of the employment contract.").
186. Of course, nothing is wrong with domination by itself since a majority or sole
shareholder always dominates the corporation.
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